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This thesis poses the question, “Under what conditions can the United States 
government gain and maintain public support for the use of force?” and contends that 
public support for the use of force is a byproduct of the interactions among four factors: 
the articulation of clearly defined political objectives; an appropriate strategy to enable 
the accomplishment of those political objectives; proper strategic cooperation; and the 
perceived legitimacy of the conflict. To demonstrate how national-level decision-makers 
can gain and maintain public support for the use of force, by appropriately addressing 
these factors, this thesis compares Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama 
with Operation Iraqi Freedom. In both instances, the United States sought regime change 
and many of the key decision-makers were the same. Yet, the United States fared much 
better in Panama than Iraq. A closer examination of our four factors—policy, strategy, 
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“Retrospective Panama: How a quagmire there threatens to bog down 
Bush’s re-election bid,” Washington Morning Star 
WASHINGTON October 18, 1992. As the election draws nearer, 
President George H. W. Bush faced more criticism this past week from the 
Clinton campaign regarding the United States’ ever-growing number of 
troops in Panama. U.S. forces continue to struggle to regain control over 
the country in the wake of Washington’s efforts to remove Manuel 
Noriega from power, a dictator Washington helped install. 
Three years ago, Moises Giraldi seemed the ideal answer to the United 
States’ Noriega problem, especially once U.S. relations with General 
Noriega had deteriorated. In retaliation for threats to U.S. access to the 
Panama Canal, the Department of Justice finally decided to indict Noriega 
on drug trafficking charges. Noriega reacted by instructing the 
Panamanian Defense Forces to attack and harass U.S. citizens in Panama. 
In the wake of his instructions, one U.S. Marine was killed, a sailor and 
his wife were unlawfully detained, and the wife was sexually harassed. As 
the U.S. prepared to unleash the dogs of war, a unique opportunity seemed 
to present itself in the form of a coup plotted by Panamanian Major 
Moises Giraldi.1 Giraldi appeared to have the backing of key elements of 
the PDF. He also promised to re-establish democracy once Noriega was 
removed. Giraldi was already in Panama, unlike the weak-seeming 
government-in-exile. Consequently, the Bush administration provided air 
support and a limited number of troops to assist in what it originally 
thought would be a relatively easy campaign to wrest Panama from 
Noriega’s grasp.  
However, not only did Panamanian forces loyal to Giraldi fail to 
apprehend Noriega during the coup, but he continued to elude capture. 
PDF elements loyal to Noriega similarly escaped. From strongholds in the 
jungle and mountain region, they quickly re-organized and began 
conducting a highly effective insurgency campaign to undermine the 
Giraldi government. As conditions worsened and access to the Panama 
Canal looked increasingly imperiled, U.S. force levels gradually crept 
higher. Now, after deploying over 100,000 troops and taking over a 
thousand casualties during a more than two-year period there is still no 
end in sight. Noriega remains at large and appears to be orchestrating the 
                                                 




insurgency. In response, the Giraldi government has recently cancelled 
upcoming elections and has begun cracking down on communities where 
it believes Noriega retains support. Allegations of human rights abuses are 
growing. Consequently, the Bush administration finds itself in a quandary. 
Giraldi is seen as Washington’s man; the U.S. can’t abandon the Panama 
Canal; and, at the same time, the government-in-exile claims that it is still 
Panama’s rightful government. In light of this, it is a small wonder that 
Bill Clinton has been able to ask at every campaign stop: “How could we 
not have known what we were doing in Panama?” Or, as a banner in his 
campaign war room summarizes his efforts to unseat Bush, “It’s the 
strategy, stupid.”  
Clearly, the news analysis reproduced above is a work of fiction. The United 
States generally performed well in Panama. Indeed, as this thesis will make clear, 
Panama was largely a success for the United States. But, what if it had gone differently? 
What if certain decisions and events had shaped operations in Panama differently? Then, 
the situation might have more closely resembled what has happened in Iraq. However, 
the fact that Panama did not turn into a quagmire or a “fiasco” along with the fact that so 
many of the same key people participated in decision-making in both conflicts begs the 
question: how did the United States get it right in Panama and so wrong in Iraq?2  
A. GENESIS 
Richard Nixon stated, “When a president sends American troops to war, a hidden 
timer starts to run. He has a finite period of time to win the war before people grow 
weary of it.”3 We believe that Nixon was partially correct, but that the start button on the 
timer is governed by factors that affect if or when the American populace actually begins 
to become weary of war. We believe that these factors include: the articulation of clearly 
defined political objectives; an appropriate strategy to enable the accomplishment of 
those political objectives; proper strategic cooperation; and the perceived legitimacy of 
the conflict. We differ from Nixon in that we do not believe that the simple act of 
deploying a force starts a clock; we suspect that the four factors explored in this thesis 
                                                 
2 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 
2006). 
3 Richard M. Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 1985), 88. 
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interact to create a threshold of U.S. domestic public support. When the U.S. population 
moves from being supportive or complacent to actively withdrawing support from U.S. 
participation in conflict it has crossed the threshold. Once this is passed, the operation, 
military leaders, political leaders, and so on, are “on the clock.” A theoretical timer has 
started and U.S. senior leadership now has three options: 1) win quickly, 2) get out 
quickly, or 3) get back under the threshold and regain public support. 
Extensive literatures already address the significance of legitimacy in nation-state 
warfare, the need to match strategy to policy, and the importance of relations to strategic 
cooperation. Our purpose is to add value to this enormous body of knowledge by 
describing how our four factors interact in today’s environment to impact public support 
for the use of force. Among the questions we seek to answer is: “If the threshold of U.S. 
domestic public support for a conflict can be identified, can senior policy makers and 
military leaders use that knowledge to prevent the United States from crossing that 
threshold, thus helping them achieve policy objectives without losing public support?” 
Presumably, monitoring the factors would assist senior leaders in the U.S. national 
security establishment to be able to make appropriate, ongoing adjustments.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Under what conditions can the United States government gain and maintain 
public support for the use of force? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To help establish the importance of our four factors, we have divided this 
literature review into four sections, with each section devoted to a single factor.   
1. Policy  
To paraphrase Clausewitz, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means.”4 In accordance with this premise, U.S. policy objectives should be clear and 
                                                 
4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.  
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must not be contradictory if the United States expects to achieve its objectives through 
the use of coercive force. While Clausewitz makes clear that war is political in nature, 
there still exists a gap in what is understood to be a policy objective and how military 
action, or military strategy, should help achieve that objective. In his article, “Towards A 
Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” Richard 
Yarger provides some much-needed detail and clarification as to what policy objectives 
are and how they relate to strategy:  
Policy is the expression of the desired end state sought by the government. 
In its finest form it is clear articulation of guidance for the employment of 
the instruments of power towards the attainment of one or more end states. 
In practice it tends to be much vaguer. Nonetheless policy dominates 
strategy by its articulation of the end state and its guidance. The analysis 
of the end state and guidance yields objectives leading to the desired end 
state. Objectives provide purpose, focus, and justification for the actions 
embodied in a strategy. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of 
objectives that is determined by the political purpose of the state. Policy 
insures that strategy pursues appropriate aims.5 
For Americans, Vietnam serves as an unfortunate example of a set of striking 
contradictions in policy. The United States’ articulated policy objective was to stop the 
spread of communism and retain a free and independent South Vietnam.6 These desires 
required the elimination of the conventional threat in the north posed by the North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA), as well as removal of the asymmetric threat in the south 
presented by the Viet Cong. However, the political aims for Vietnam were subordinate to 
and inappropriately nested within the U.S. Cold War aim of avoiding Chinese 
intervention and preventing vertical escalation with Russia, which could possibly lead to 
a nuclear World War III. In essence, this greater Cold War policy served to significantly 
restrict the military strategy by forbidding any action that could accidentally lead to 
                                                 
5 Richard H. Yarger, “Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College 
Strategy Model,” in The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, ed. J. Boone 
Bartholomees, Jr., 4th ed. (Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 
46. 
6 “Joint Resolution 1145,” 88th Cong. (August 10, 1964). 
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escalation with America’s Cold War foes. Yet, it also ultimately undermined America’s 
policy objective in Vietnam.  
Not only did the United States’ contradictory war aims prevent strategists from 
appropriately projecting forces into North Vietnam, thereby effectively thwarting any 
chance of obtaining a political victory in Vietnam, but worse, by not appropriately 
nesting policy objectives and clearly articulating those objectives to the American public, 
U.S. political leaders lost public support for the use of coercive force. Again, to borrow 
from Clausewitz, “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—
without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he 
intends to conduct it.”7  
In this age of limited warfare, when total war by a nuclear power is prohibited by 
social norms, having clear political objectives becomes all the more critical for two 
reasons. First, to enable strategists to develop war plans that can achieve the stated 
political goals. Second, without an end state, the war effort is doomed to drag on 
indefinitely and will inevitably lead to a loss of public support and a degradation of 
public confidence in both government and military as exhibited during the Vietnam War 
and more recently, as we will see in the following chapters.  
2. Strategy  
Equally important is for the U.S. government to explicitly describe what it wants 
to achieve in policy. Without this, war planners cannot develop a strategy that will meet 
Washington’s intent. In his article, “Politics and the American Way of War (and 
Strategy),” Frank Hoffman describes some interesting friction points regarding strategy 
implementation during a conflict. First, he recalls Antulio Echevarria’s observation about 
the paradox between the conceptualization of strategy as an art and the development of 
strategy as a science. Second, he blames a cultural turn in the U.S. military for its 
aversion to considering political constraints while developing strategy. He reminds us 
that, as Sir Lawrence Freedman notes, “one finds among American military thinking that 
                                                 
7 Clausewitz, On War, 579. 
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politics is often treated [by]…military theory as an awkward exogenous factor, at best a 
necessary inconvenience and at worst a source of weakness and constraint.”8 In addition 
to ignoring political realities, Hoffman explains that the U.S. military sometimes fails in 
other regards as well, for instance when planners clearly devise a strategy they deem 
necessary to pursue and then very plainly assign inappropriate forces to accomplish that 
strategy.  
Richard Yarger makes an argument that helps explain these gaps. He begins by 
acknowledging that within U.S. military culture, there may be no overarching theory of 
strategy to which those in uniform subscribe. Yarger finds this disappointing since the 
Army War College’s strategic model (created by Art Lykke) of ends, ways, and means, 
seems to offer a simple yet effective rubric. According to Yarger, strategy as a theoretical 
model is simply misunderstood, as it has been rendered unnecessarily complex “as a 
result of confusion over terminology and definitions and the underlying assumptions and 
premises.”9 
Yarger contends that the first failure of U.S. strategy may lie with the words and 
definitions surrounding the concept itself. In Yarger’s view, the word “strategy” is often 
used to merely describe a plan or idea with regard to a general path to be taken within a 
conflict. This loose application of “strategy” in the vernacular undercuts how important it 
is to conceptualize strategy at the highest levels. Plainly put, strategy offers control, 
direction, and guidance to war planners as they react to an ever-changing strategic and 
operational environment. An appropriate strategy offers a safety net that prevents war 
from becoming a runaway train, or an end in and of itself. As strategy is developed and 
implemented, its ends, ways, and means must serve to complement, not complicate, one 
another:  
Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power 
(means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of 
circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that 
                                                 
8 Frank Hoffman, “Politics and the American Way of War (and Strategy),” War on the Rocks, October 
15, 2013, http://warontherocks.com/2013/10/politics-and-the-american-way-of-war-and-strategy/. 
9 Yarger, “Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” 45. 
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support state interests. Strategy provides direction for the coercive or 
persuasive use of this power to achieve specified objectives. This direction 
is by nature proactive. It seeks to control the environment as opposed to 
reacting to it. Strategy is not crisis management. It is its antithesis. Crisis 
management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails.10 
Essentially, if strategists were to be given a clear political objective that decision 
makers seek to achieve via the use of coercive force, then our nation’s leaders would 
have a far better chance of designing the ways by which to achieve those ends. Or, to 
again borrow from Yarger, who himself quotes an analogy of Art Lykke’s, imagine 
that strategy starts as a balanced three-legged bar stool. The legs of the stool are 
comprised of the ends, ways, and means of strategy. If strategists develop ways that fall 
short, the stool will tilt, ultimately increasing the risk of failure and destabilizing the 
strategy as a whole.11  
Yarger invokes the bar stool strategy to raise three critical questions strategists 
should always ask: “What is to be done? How is it to be done? What resources are 
required to do it in this manner?”12 Here, we would like to suggest that a crucial fourth 
question is missing: who should do it? We are driven to add this question based on the 
observation that while strategists and commanders have defined our current adversaries 
as posing an asymmetric, unconventional threat, they have then tasked conventional 
attrition-focused forces with taking the lead, even though these forces are not trained, 
organized, or equipped to counter such a threat.  
In his article, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft analyzes why weak actors have begun to best strong actors in armed 
conflicts. Interestingly, his deductions help to pinpoint gaps in current strategic 
approaches (ways).  
I argue that the universe of potential strategies and counterstrategies can 
be reduced to two distinct ideal-type strategic approaches: direct and 
indirect. Direct approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 45. 
11 Ibid., 48. 
12 Ibid., 49. 
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destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to 
destroy an adversary’s will to fight … Same-approach interactions (direct-
direct or indirect-indirect) imply defeat for weak actors because there is 
nothing to mediate or deflect a strong actor’s power advantage. These 
interactions will therefore be resolved quickly. By contrast, opposite- 
approach interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) imply victory for 
weak actors because the strong actor’s power advantage is deflected or 
dodged. These therefore tend to be protracted, with time favoring the 
weak.13 
Arreguín-Toft’s “opposite-approach strategy” can be observed in Iraq and Afghanistan as 
U.S. general purpose forces were surged into both countries with the goal of defeating an 
insurgency via presence patrols, movements-to-contact, micro-loans, the distribution of 
soccer balls, drone strikes, and chasing around guerrillas that always seemed to just elude 
capture or even proliferate overnight. This mismatch between forces has a tendency, 
according to Arreguín-Toft, to drag out conflicts and has historically proven problematic 
for the United States. Moreover, Arreguín-Toft describes a circular dynamic by which 
mismatched interactions in asymmetric conflicts can lead to lackluster performance, 
thereby guaranteeing an unexpected delay in the attainment of military or political 
objectives. This failure, in turn, then leads to the commitment of additional forces that are 
still unable to best their asymmetric opponent, further delaying any likely victory,  and 
leading ultimately to domestic pressure for withdrawal from the conflict.14  
3. Strategic Cooperation  
 In our thesis, we define strategic cooperation as the overt unity of effort at the 
highest levels within the U.S. government. Strategic cooperation refers to healthy civil-
military relations and, perhaps more importantly, healthy interagency collaboration 
among principals in the executive branch. While strategic cooperation should be 
considered essential to effectively generate strategy and implement policy, it can prove 
difficult to execute.  
                                                 
13 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 105. 
14 Ibid., 105.  
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 In The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 
Samuel Huntington describes civil-military relations as an integral component of national 
security policy, which has the ultimate aim of advancing “the safety of the nation’s 
social, economic, and political institutions against threats arising from other independent 
states.”15 In Huntington’s view:  
Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military 
relations have a great advantage in their search for security. They increase 
their likelihood of reaching right answers to the operating issues of 
military policy. Nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-
military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risks.16 
Imbalances may not simply result from a lack of consideration, or pure incompetence. 
Rather, they may be the manifestation of an underlying struggle between two forces 
Huntington believes are faced by all societies. These are the “functional imperatives,” 
which are derived from perceived threats, and the “social imperatives,” which are derived 
from the principles and organizations dominating society.17 Moreover, Huntington 
teaches us that since the 1940s, technological advances and new forms of international 
relations have stripped the United States of its enduring sense of assumed national 
security. Certainly, the public’s perceptions of our security condition have ebbed and 
flowed since The Soldier and the State was published. However, disagreements over the 
state of our security and what should be done about it endure. Indeed, Huntington frames 
the two questions we continue to wrestle with: “What pattern of civil-military relations is 
most compatible with American liberal democratic values? …[and] What pattern of civil 
military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation?”18 
 As Hy Rothstein describes the tensions inherent in civilian-military relations, 
“The central issue in civil-military relationships involves a simple paradox: Because 
people fear others, they create an institution of violence for protection; but then this very 
                                                 
15 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 1. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 Ibid., 3. 
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institution becomes a source of fear.”19 Within the United States, this fear may not 
translate into alarm over a possible coup or military takeover. However, it can concern 
control over the outcome of a war. In a democracy, civilian and military leaders should 
be in agreement. As Rothstein goes on to explain, “Civilian leaders are responsible for 
setting the policy goals, providing resources, establishing strategic priorities, and even 
levying operational constraints.”20 Meanwhile, “Military leaders must insist on clarity 
regarding the purpose of the military operation, and must object when … the use of force, 
the constraints applied, or the resources provided are unlikely to deliver the expressed 
policy goals.”21  
We like this description of civil-military relations because it acknowledges an 
environment wherein the military is indeed beholden to its civilian masters; however, it 
also describes an environment in which military leaders’ opinions are valued and 
respected. At the same time, we would also go a step further and suggest that healthy 
civil-military relations are necessary for obtaining victory, and that the concept of an 
attainable victory is itself essential for sustaining, retaining, and maintaining public 
support.  
 While healthy civil-military relations are vital to strategic cooperation, and thus 
our ability to achieve success in war, a separate, perhaps more important set of relations 
has to exist at the highest level of the U.S. government: namely, those among foreign 
policy, defense, and homeland security principals. The nature of these interpersonal 
relations can enhance or cripple the United States’ ability to formulate appropriate policy 
or strategy well before traditional civil-military frictions arise. The principals with the 
highest levels of influence on U.S. decision-making include the President, Vice President, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the 
President for National Security (ANSA), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
                                                 
19 Leo J. Blanken, Hy S. Rothstein, and Jason J. Lepore, eds., Assessing War: The Challenge of 
Measuring Success and Failure (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 19. Additionally, 
in the text of this source, the author cites Peter Feaver in citation 12 of Chapter II.  
20 Ibid., 19. 
21 Ibid., 20. 
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the Director of National Intelligence.22 When the relationships among these principals 
become dysfunctional, the United States can expect to see shortcomings in its strategic 
decision-making. In other words, if, for instance, the vice president or secretary of 
defense is actively working to weaken the role of the secretary of state or ANSA within 
the policy-making process, we can expect bureaucratic in-fighting. As Doug Borer notes 
(pace Alexander George), in order to have a:  
Balanced and adequate flow of information and advice to the 
president…First, there must be a roughly equal distribution of intellectual 
and bureaucratic resources among the major actors in the NSC system. 
Second, there must be presidential-level monitoring of the process to make 
sure it was flowing smoothly. Finally, there must be adequate time and 
opportunity for debate and analysis of options [and] in order for the 
multiple advocacy system to work, the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs (ANSA) must manage the process closely.23 
4. Legitimacy  
Legitimacy may be the most important of the factors that contribute to 
determining the threshold of U.S. domestic public support for conflict. Just War theory, 
as commonly described, encompasses both jus ad bellum (going to war justly) and jus in 
bello (right conduct in war), “The jus ad bellum lays down the conditions that must be 
met in order to have permissible recourse to armed coercion.”24  
The following criteria frequently appear in comprehensive just-war 
theories: legitimate or competent authority, just cause, right intention, 
announcement of intention, last resort, reasonable hope of success, 
proportionality, and just conduct. All these criteria taken together, with the 
exception of the last one, establish the jus ad bellum, the right to go to 
                                                 
22 “National Security Council,” The White House, accessed October 20, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/node/146. (site modified); Since the Truman era, “the [National Security] 
Council’s function has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The 
Council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various 
government agencies.” 
23 Douglas A. Borer and Stephen W. Twing, “Blundering into Baghdad: An Analysis of Strategy, 
Structure, Principles and Agents,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24, no. 3 (September 2011): 
500. 
24 William Vincent O’Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York, NY: Praeger, 1981), 
16. 
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war, while the last criterion focuses on the jus in bello, right conduct 
within war.25 
Meeting these conditions can be challenging and still generates debate, but policy-
makers in democratic institutions are expected to consider them prior to committing 
troops to combat.  
For the most part, meeting the jus ad bellum criterion was considered sufficient 
until the twentieth century. Then, with the advent of large, international alliances and 
international law as the result of two world wars, along with the advent of nuclear 
weapons that could destroy humanity, the United States found itself subjected to 
heightened scrutiny as the world’s superpower. According to Robert W. Tucker and 
David C. Hendrickson in “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” the four pillars of 
American legitimacy are that: the United States “pledges the use of U.S. power to 
[uphold] international law;” United States legitimacy and power are “enhanced by 
Washington’s commitment to consensual modes of decision-making;” the United States 
must preserve its reputation “for moderation in policy;” and America must succeed “in 
preserving peace and prosperity within the community of advanced industrial 
democracies.”26 But, even these, along with constraints accepted as part of Just War 
theory, do not fully reflect today’s realities given the now-pervasive influence of the 
media and the requirement for enduring public support for military action. Indeed, as 
Tucker and Hendrickson themselves note, “Ultimately … legitimacy is rooted in 
opinion.”27  
When it comes to the use of coercive force, the relationship between legitimacy 
and public support is perhaps the most important, most complex, and most difficult to 
have to try to predict or influence. This difficulty stems from two sources. First, modern 
news media, both domestic and international, have the ability to influence public opinion 
                                                 
25 James F. Childress, “Just-War Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of their 
Criteria,” Theological Studies 39, no. 3 (September 1978): 428, doi: 10.1177/004056397803900302. 
26 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” Foreign 
Affairs 83, no. 6 (December 2004): 18-32. doi: 10.2307/20034134. 
27 Ibid. 
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to a greater extent than at any point in history. Their influence can deflate public support 
for an operation which otherwise meets all of the criteria described by both jus ad bellum 
and Tucker and Hendrickson. Conversely, their influence can drastically pump up 
support for an operation that does not otherwise pass all of the criteria discussed above.  
Second, as the criteria for determining legitimacy have evolved over the course of 
the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, so has the American public’s ability to express 
either its support of, or objections to military action. Both can occur simultaneously as we 
see with polarization over the use of force. However, if, on the whole, the U.S. 
population seems supportive of action, the government’s task of obtaining and 
maintaining public support can seem achievable. Generally, in this thesis we argue that to 
obtain legitimacy for the use of force one must meet the criterion outlined in jus ad 
bellum through the articulation of clear and well-defined policy objectives. Then, to 
maintain legitimacy, an appropriate strategy must be implemented to satisfy the criterion 
of jus in bello.  Maintaining anything over the long term, of course, presents significant 
challenges. General Fred Weyand, who served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (1974-
1976), puts it well: “When the Army is committed the American people are committed, 
when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try and keep the Army 
committed … the Army is not so much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of 
the American people.”28  
While we would greatly agree with General Weyand that the Army can be 
representative of the American people, the population’s ability to “check” both the 
government and the military has changed significantly since his day.29 After all, the army 
General Weyand was speaking of was largely a draft army. Since Vietnam, the United 
States has chosen to instead maintain a professional, all-volunteer standing army. In the 
era of an “All-Volunteer Force” and “Professional Army,” the question now becomes, 
                                                 
28 Harry G Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Random 
House, 1995), 11. 
29 Clausewitz, On War, 89. 
 14 
how can the American public serve as a viable counter-balance to the government when 
people can no longer vote with their feet and protest the draft?  
D. METHODS AND ROADMAP 
To illustrate how our four factors interact, we will examine Operations Just Cause 
and Promote Liberty (Chapter II) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Chapter III). In doing so, 
we will examine the role of each factor. Then, in Chapter IV, we will compare 
similarities between the lead-up to Panama and the lead-up to Iraq, the similarities among 
the policy options available, and the overlap among strategic decision-makers involved in 
both cases. We will consider why, despite the similarities between the strategic aims, the 
United States fared so much better in Panama than in Iraq.  Ultimately, this will return us 
to our three assertions: 
Assertion 1: We differ from Nixon in that we do not believe that the simple act of 
deploying a force starts a clock; we suspect that the four factors explored in this thesis 
interact to create a threshold of U.S. domestic public support.  
Assertion 2: When the U.S. population moves from being supportive or 
complacent to actively withdrawing support from U.S. participation in conflict it has 
crossed the threshold. 
Assertion 3: Once this threshold is passed, the operation, military leaders, political 
leaders, and so on, are “on the clock.” A theoretical timer has started and U.S. senior 
leadership now has three options: 1) win quickly, 2) get out quickly, or 3) get back under 
the threshold and regain public support.  
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II. OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE AND PROMOTE LIBERTY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama are generally viewed as 
successful U.S. endeavors to execute regime change. Yes, there were some hiccups and 
some public outcry at home, but overall, and especially in light of Iraq and Afghanistan 
post-2001, most would likely agree that U.S. efforts in Panama in the late 1980s and early 
1990s were a success. Yet, ever since the commencement of operations in the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT), or some might say since the first Gulf War, Panama is often 
overlooked as a meaningful case study. Critics might contend that the United States 
should have won—it was a global superpower at the time, pitted against a small, 
relatively weak military. Or, as one Marine once said, “A superpower whipped the poop 
out of 10 percent of the police force of a Third World nation. You are supposed to be able 
to do that. It was done well, and I credit those who did it. But it is important that we draw 
the right lessons from it.”30  
However, no matter how easy it might appear in retrospect, in actuality Panama 
could have gone quite differently. If not for a few key decisions and interactions, it might 
have ended up more like Iraq.  
We realize this is a bold claim. But, by evaluating U.S. efforts leading up to and 
during Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty through the lenses of each of our four 
factors—policy, strategy, strategic cooperation and legitimacy—we hope to make clear 
that decisions taken at the time enabled the United States to both achieve its political 
goals through the use of force and maintain public support for its operations.  
B. POLICY 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the purpose of policy objectives is to 
describe what the government wants to achieve. When it comes to the use of force, the 
                                                 
30 Jennifer M. Taw, Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other than War (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1996), vii.  
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American public should understand why the government is committing the military to a 
conflict, what it is going to achieve, and when it will be finished in terms of either time or 
conditions. To be most effective, policy objectives must be clear, must be reasonably 
achievable, and must not contradict other objectives or national aims. U.S. policy 
objectives for Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty largely met these criteria. 
At 1:40 AM on December 20, 1989, less than one hour after the commencement 
of combat operations in Panama, Mr. Marlin Fitzwater, the White House Press Secretary, 
announced that the invasion of Panama was underway and outlined the four U.S. policy 
objectives for the operation: 1) protect American lives; 2) restore the democratic process; 
3) preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties; and 4) apprehend Manuel 
Noriega.31 Three of these met the criteria described above for well-articulated policy 
objectives; however, restoring the democratic process would prove to be a little more 
ambiguous. 
 The policy objectives of protecting American lives, preserving the integrity of the 
Panama Canal treaties, and apprehending Manuel Noriega were clear, were achievable, 
and in no way contradicted any other U.S. policy. More importantly, the average 
American could look at these objectives and reasonably ascertain the conditions that 
would have to be met for these tasks to be considered complete. For example, was the 
Panamanian government now friendly to the United States? Was it still harassing our 
military? Had the people who were hostile toward the United States been removed from 
power? Did the U.S. have unfettered access to the Panama Canal? Was Manuel Noriega 
in United States or Panamanian custody? If the answers to these questions were “yes,” 
then the United States had likely accomplished what it set out to do in regard to its first 
three stated policy objectives. 
Success regarding the remaining policy objective, to restore the democratic 
process in Panama, was bound to be more difficult to judge. This objective was very 
                                                 
31 “Announcement of U.S. Invasion of Panama.” CSPAN video. 15:00, from the White House Press 
Secretary’s announcement of the U.S. invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989. https://www.c-
span.org/video/?10386-1/announcement-us-invasion-panama. 
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much in line with traditional U.S. foreign policy guidelines—to support democracies 
worldwide.32 The problem lies with the end state of this objective. How would the United 
States know when it had restored the democratic process? Would this be achieved when 
Noriega was captured and the democratically-elected leader, President Endara, was in the 
capital? Or would it only be evident after another round of elections, or after the United 
States was sure that the influence and corruption associated with Noriega had been 
eliminated from the government?  
All of these are very subjective questions, which would have made it difficult for 
either the U.S. public or U.S. elected officials to determine when this fourth policy 
objective had been accomplished. They also beg the most overarching question: how 
much democracy did the president want—though perhaps a more appropriate objective 
might have been to consider democratic legitimacy from the Panamanian perspective. 
Democratic legitimacy is described as “The degree of popular support for the 
government. The perception that corruption within the government has been limited to an 
acceptable level. The perception of the government’s ability to govern. The existence of 
alternatives to political violence.”33 
C. STRATEGY 
 The intent here is not to analyze the invasion of Panama at the tactical level, but 
rather to address the direction of the strategy and choices made during Operations Just 
Cause and Promote Liberty. Thus, many details about skirmishes and fighting will be 
omitted. Fortunately, at the highest level, leaders and staff within the Department of 
Defense understood that the objectives to be achieved in Panama required more than just 
the employment of fire and maneuver, but would require the use of forces from across the 
                                                 
32 “Democracy,” www.state.gov, N.D. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/democ/. 
33 John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama (Carlisle 
Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 56, 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA251124. 
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full spectrum of operations.34 Moreover, the specific nature of the policy aims given to 
the military facilitated the construction of a strategy to achieve our nation’s ends. This 
understanding led the CJCS to provide guidance regarding how (the ways) the 
intervention in Panama would be executed. The operation would be divided into three 
phases, with almost the entirety of combat operations occurring during Operation Just 
Cause. Stability operations would be carried out during both Operations Just Cause and 
Promote Liberty. The concept of the strategy was as follows:  
Phase 1: Combat operations at the onset were designed to neutralize and 
fix in place the PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces], capture Noriega, 
install a new government, and protect and defend U.S. citizens and key 
facilities. Phase 2: Stability operations to ensure law and order and begin 
the transition to support a newly installed government. Phase 3: Nation-
building that supported the new Endara government to include 
restructuring and training the new government.35 
 Just prior to the launch of assault forces into Panama, the legally elected president 
of Panama, President Endara, and his two vice presidents joined General Thurman 
(CINCSOUTH) and Mr. John Bushnell (Deputy Chief of Mission Panama) at the 
SOUTHCOM Headquarters, in Panama City, to be sworn in by a Panamanian judge. By 
assuming their offices they would be able to oversee efforts to reconstitute the 
government of Panama.36 Then, on December 20, 1989, Operation Just Cause began. Not 
surprisingly, the invasion of Panama was wildly successful as the military force the 
United States could bring to bear overwhelmed the mostly conventional attempt made by 
the Noriega regime to stop its advance. By 1800 on D-day, one of the U.S. conventional 
task forces, TF Bayonet, had complete control of the PDF HQ compound, known as the 
Comandancia. The loss of this compound destroyed the PDF’s ability to conventionally 
                                                 
34 Specific leaders within the Department of Defense (DOD) included the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Commander in Chief of Southern 
Command (CINCSOUTH), and the Commander of Joint Task Force - South (JTFSO). 
35 E. M. Flanagan, Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause (Washington: Brassey’s (US), Inc, 
1993), 40.  
36 Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in 
Panama, February 1988 - January 1990 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 1995), 35.; President Guillermo Endara had been elected by the people of Panama in May of 1989; 
however, General Noriega nullified the results of the election and remained in power by force. 
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command and control resistance throughout Panama, and within a few days the PDF 
would be rendered irrelevant as an opposition force.37  
A few weeks later, on January 3, Noriega was captured and placed under custody 
of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and flown to Homestead Air Force Base, 
Florida. In short, the invasion illustrated the United States’ ability to expertly utilize  
the element of surprise, under the cover of darkness, by using 
overwhelming force, and by multiple simultaneous strikes that dominated 
the land, air, and sea. An overwhelming U.S. presence during the combat 
phase of operations translated into security through strength. The use of 
military force also served as leverage against opposition during follow-on 
stability operations.38  
Constraints placed on the nature of the invasion also reveal an understanding that 
the strategy would have to shift from overt fighting to stability operations, where the 
legitimacy of the new Panamanian government would be tested and on display. These 
constraints were designed to “limit collateral damage,” to include infrastructure, and to 
“minimize casualties on both sides.”39 This decision to tread carefully would greatly 
assist the re-integration of former PDF members into the reconstituted security apparatus.  
 On January 20, 1990, Operation Just Cause officially ended, with the re-
deployment of combat troops under the temporarily formed Joint Task Force-South 
(JTFSO) (created specifically for combat operations and dissolved upon its 
successful execution), leaving the newly formed Military Support Group (MSG) under 
the command of the Joint Task Force-Panama (JTF-PM) as the DOD entity responsible 
for overseeing the execution of Phases 2 and 3, specifically, stability operations and 
nation building.40 The MSG was the result of a coordinated effort by U.S. Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM), SOUTHCOM and JTF-SOUTH to overcome perceived 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 41. 
38 William J. Conley Jr., “Operations ‘Just Cause’ and ‘Promote Liberty’: The Implications of Military 
Operations Other Than War” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2001), 29.  
39 Ibid., 13.  
40 Ibid., 25.  
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failures experienced during the first month after the invasion and to reinstate the 
legitimate government of Panama.  
The official mission statement of the MSG was to “Conduct nation building 
operations to ensure democracy, internationally recognized standards of justice, and 
professional public services are established and institutionalized in Panama.”41 Although 
not perfect, when it was disbanded just over a year after the invasion, the MSG was said 
to have “left behind a relatively stable country with a functioning government.”42 The 
MSG coordinated closely with the U.S. Embassy and Government of Panama and had  
established and trained a police force and turned the training mission over 
to the Department of Justice … took charge of the military exercise 
programme which, in cooperation with other U.S. agencies and the 
Panamanian government, carried engineering and medical services to 
many parts of rural Panama … Finally, the MSG drafted, in coordination 
with the U.S. Embassy, a country strategy for all U.S. government 
agencies with respect to Panama.43 
In hindsight, perhaps the single most beneficial decision made by the Panamanian 
government on the advice of the MSG was to develop a new police force, into which 
former PDF members were (re)integrated. We believe this decision prevented 13,000 
former PDF members from merging grievance with opportunity to destabilize the 
country, which would have de-legitimized the government of Panama, and required a 
more enduring and overt U.S. security presence in the region.44  
 We do not mean to suggest that all aspects of Operations Just Cause and Promote 
Liberty were executed perfectly; many mistakes were made, ranging from inappropriate 
compartmentalization at the onset of planning between DOD and civilian agencies 
                                                 
41 John T. Fishel, “The Murky World of Conflict Termination: Planning and Executing the 1989–90 
Restoration of Panama,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 3, no. 1 (March 1992): 65, 
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42 Lawrence Yates, “Panama, 1988–1999: The Disconnect between Combat and Stability Operations,” 
Military Review 85, no. 3 (June 2005): 51. 
43 Fishel, “The Murky World of Conflict Termination,” 66.  
44 Conley, “Operations ‘Just Cause’ and ‘Promote Liberty’: The Implications of Military Operations 
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(which added to a lack of preparedness by DOS/DOJ),45 to incorrect assumptions 
regarding the speed with which the Panamanian government would be capable of 
assuming full control.46 Also, what democracy and nation building meant vis a vis U.S. 
strategy was never tightly defined.47 But, worth emphasizing is that failures were 
primarily limited to the tactical and operational realm, resulting in what seemed at times 
to be small-scale panic, considerable numbers of refugees, and limited looting. Yet, 
overall, the strategic direction adopted at the outset, and the military’s ability to adjust to 
failures along the way, allowed for the correction of these problems and ultimately 
yielded a strategy capable of achieving the political aims sought by the National 
Command Authority (NCA).48 Moreover, although there were outbreaks of disorder, 
there was no organized enemy operating asymmetrically to take advantage of the 
operational environment. Rather, the United States’ nested strategic thinking, to include 
decisions to reconstitute the fairly elected government, to re-integrate the PDF into the 
security apparatus, to preserve infrastructure, and to pursue its goals via civil-military 
operations, were largely responsible for preventing potential enemy factions from finding 
traction. All of these decisions also assisted the Panamanian government to move in a 
direction that supported U.S. initiatives. 
D. STRATEGIC COOPERATION  
 As described earlier, in democracies, there must be agreement among a nation’s 
civilian and military leaders in order to achieve the ends envisioned for going to war in 
the first place. This relationship does not simply imply military obedience to the state, but 
rather depends on a healthy interaction among principle policy makers along with 
military planners, and ongoing exchanges between those establishing our political 
objectives and those charged with executing them through the use of force. Upon 
analysis, the evidence suggests that while there were compartmentalization and 
                                                 
45 Taw, Operation Just Cause, 26. 
46 Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, 33.  
47 Ibid., 43. 
48 Yates, “Panama, 1988–1999: The Disconnect between Combat and Stability Operations,” 50–51. 
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coordination failures initially between DOD and civilian agencies regarding Panama, 
there was an absence of overt infighting.  
 When President Bush replaced Ronald Reagan on January 20, 1989, he was 
initially content to maintain Reagan’s force buildup plan designed to bring to an end to 
the slowly developing crisis in Panama. Principal advisors serving under Reagan 
supported the idea of a U.S. force buildup in Panama, which would either pressure 
Noriega into stepping down or even possibly incentivize PDF leaders under Noriega to 
remove him through force.49 Furthermore, Reagan’s advisors also believed a U.S. 
invasion that failed to immediately capture Noriega might lead to his escape to the 
mountains where he would be able to create a guerrilla force.50 However, Noriega’s 
nullification of the May 1989 elections results and the violence he sanctioned against his 
politically victorious opponents served as a catalyst to move President Bush away from 
the force buildup policy, and toward one of surprise intervention.51 This shift in policy 
led to the removal of General Woerner, who was a chief critic of a surprise military 
invasion, and his replacement by General Thurman as CINCSOUTH. For those serving in 
the Pentagon, “Thurman’s assignment signaled a shift in SOUTHCOM’s focus from 
security assistance to diplomacy toward greater combat readiness.”52 
 At the same time that President Bush began to tilt toward the potential use of 
military force, he made a number of other personnel changes. For instance, the newly 
appointed CJCS would play a critical role, and the Joint History Office notes that:  
As Chairman, Powell would benefit from longstanding personal 
relationships with political leaders in both the Reagan and Bush 
administrations. Under Reagan, Powell, as National Security Adviser, had 
worked closely on Panamanian issues with Vice President Bush. As 
Commander in Chief, Forces Command, during the Bush presidency, 
                                                 
49 President Reagan’s principle advisors included Frank Carlucci as SECDEF; Admiral Crowe as 
CJCS; and General Woerner as CINCSOUTH. 
50 Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 
1988 - January 1990, 7.  
51 Ibid., 12. 
52 Ibid., 13.  
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Powell had worked on aspects of the burgeoning political crisis in 
Panama.53 
Interestingly, General Powell was the “most junior of the fifteen four-stars legally 
eligible for the chairmanship” when he was nominated by Secretary Cheney and 
supported by President Bush.54 This likely demonstrated the confidence that President 
Bush and his administration had in Powell’s ability to see their vision through. Within 
days of Powell’s confirmation, he was asked to offer recommendations regarding a U.S. 
course of action in response to the October 3, 1989, coup attempt by one of Noriega’s 
PDF officers. Powell recommended that while support to the coup might facilitate 
Noriega’s loss of power, it was not likely to relieve the underlying conditions that 
enabled Noriega to rule.  Nor would it achieve Bush’s political aims of restoring 
democracy in Panama. Perhaps even more important than Powell’s recommendation was 
concurrence by Secretary Cheney, General Thurman, and all of the president’s top 
advisors.55  
At the conclusion of the October 3 crisis, Powell reflected on his lessons learned:  
Cheney was cool and solid; the Joint Staff was a fast-moving, professional 
organization; and President Bush, while tolerating the noisy swirl of 
advisors around him, saw through the essence of issues and made sound 
decisions.56 
Given Powell’s prior experience as the national security advisor, his understanding of 
both the Reagan and Bush administration’s policy aims for Panama, his dedication to the 
tenet that there needed to be a political aim in any conflict, and his intimate 
understanding of the strategic environment in Panama, he proved able to give sound 
military advice to the SECDEF and president without overstepping the boundaries of his 
roles and responsibilities.57  
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55 Ibid., 418. 
56 Ibid., 419. 
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The Bush administration’s ability to forge strategic cooperation between civilian 
leaders responsible for establishing policy and those responsible for executing Operations 
Just Cause and Promote Liberty not only greatly enhanced the United States’ probability 
of success, but such cooperation prevented either government or security force vacuums; 
these were not an option for the Bush administration or its CJCS. Again, we do not want 
to suggest that cooperation or unity of effort was perfect during the lead up to and 
execution of Just Cause and Promote Liberty. Interagency collaboration did suffer in the 
beginning as a direct result of DOD compartmentalization regarding operational security 
concerns. However, at the time of the invasion, from the NCA level down to the 
Commander of JTF-Panama, there appeared to be a shared understanding regarding the 
threat that the Noriega regime posed to U.S. interests, and the conviction that simply 
removing Noriega without setting the conditions for future success would lead to the void 
being filled by a Noriega clone.58   
E. LEGITIMACY 
The Bush administration clearly recognized the significance of replacing 
Noriega’s regime with one that Panamanians would consider legitimate. When it comes 
to legitimacy there are generally three critical audiences: the indigenous population of the 
target country, the international community at large, and the U.S. domestic population. 
Each of these audiences must be addressed to gain and maintain legitimacy for the use of 
force.  However, to gain legitimacy and to maintain legitimacy are two separate tasks. In 
many respects, this is analogous to making the case for jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  
1. Jus ad Bellum 
 Typically, the three driving factors that establish jus ad bellum for the United 
States are U.S. policy, international law and treaties to which the United States is a 
signatory, and the events that occurred leading up to the conflict. Below, we will examine 
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how these factors contributed to satisfying the requirements prescribed by jus ad bellum 
for the incursion into Panama. 
 In making a case for the use of force, U.S. Secretary of State Jim Baker stated in 
an interview on December 21, 1989, that “The United States, under international law, has 
an inherent right of self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter and Article 21 of the O.A.S. Charter, which entitles us to take measures 
necessary to defend our military personnel, our United States nationals and U.S. 
installations.”59  The responsibility to meet the requirement for a legitimate or competent 
authority to declare war and approve military intervention rested with the president and 
Congress. As for a legitimate authority to direct the operation, approval came from the 
President of the United States and the legal justification was in accordance with the 
United Nations (UN) Charter and Organization of American States (OAS) charter. 
 Developing an argument that a war is being undertaken for a “just cause” is the 
most important, and often the most difficult, requirement to satisfy. Often, this argument 
is made by describing the actions and counteractions of each belligerent as they draw 
closer to armed conflict. This “road to war” approach usually culminates with listing the 
policy objectives, or intentions, that going to war will achieve. On the morning of 
December 20, 1989, President Bush succinctly and effectively made his just cause case 
by describing the road to war and the policy objectives he sought:  
At 0700, President Bush spoke to the nation: 
Fellow citizens, last night I ordered U.S. military forces to Panama....For 
nearly two years the United States, nations of Latin America and the 
Caribbean have worked together to resolve the crisis in Panama. The goals 
of the United States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to 
defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect 
the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty. Many attempts have been made 
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to resolve the crisis through diplomacy and negotiations. All were rejected 
by the dictator of Panama, General Manuel A. Noriega, an indicted drug 
trafficker. Last Friday Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a 
state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of 
Americans in Panama. The very next day forces under his command shot 
and killed an unarmed American serviceman, wounded another, arrested 
and brutally beat a third American serviceman and then brutally 
interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That was enough. 
General Noriega’s reckless threats and attacks upon Americans created an 
imminent danger to the thirty-five thousand American citizens in Panama. 
As President I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of 
American citizens. And that is why I directed our armed forces to protect 
the lives of Americans citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega to 
justice in the United States.... 
I took this action only after reaching the conclusion that every other 
avenue was closed and the lives of American citizens were in grave 
danger...60 
Of the four policy objectives listed above, protecting America’s access to the Panama 
Canal clearly represented a vital interest. Access to the canal is the chief reason why the 
United States had a presence in Panama to begin with. Without access to the canal, U.S. 
national security and economic interests would be severely undermined. Protecting 
American lives, spreading democracy, and combatting drugs were undoubtedly 
important. However, none of these objectives on their own would meet the requirements 
to justify going to war. Those three objectives as supporting arguments behind the main 
objective—to protect America’s vital interest regarding access to the Panama Canal—
satisfied the requirement for a just cause in going to war.  
 The next two requirements, right intention and the announcement of that right 
intention, are equivalent to having a policy for the use of force and publically stating that 
policy, as witnessed in President Bush’s address to the nation and international 
community. These two steps may seem simple, but, in a democracy, they are the linchpin 
to gaining public support for the use of force.  
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 The requirement of justifying war as the ultima ratio, or the last resort, can be 
considered problematic because it would seem to some that the only way to meet the last 
resort criterion would be to act in self-defense. This would restrict a state from being the 
first to use force, thereby relegating it to only accept going to war after first being 
attacked. However, according to Childress, “The requirement that war be the last resort 
does not mean that all possible measures have to be attempted and exhausted if there is 
no reasonable expectation that they will be successful.”61 The United States had reached 
this point with Noriega in Panama. The United States had exhausted the use of economic 
sanctions after Noriega nullified legitimate election results and it had indicted Noriega on 
drug charges on February 4, 1988.62 Furthermore, Noriega’s PDF had harassed and killed 
U.S. service members in Panama. Lastly, Noriega had declared war on the United 
States.63 At this point, the United States had reasonably exhausted all options short of 
war, thus meeting the criterion of last resort.  
2. Jus in Bello 
 If policy is the driving force behind establishing legitimacy for going to war (jus 
ad bellum), then strategy is the key to maintaining legitimacy throughout the conduct of 
war (jus in bello).  
 Legitimacy regarding U.S. intentions to restore democracy in Panama was 
significantly bolstered when the United States facilitated the return and establishment of 
the legitimately elected Endara government just prior to beginning combat operations.64 
The fact that Noriega had nullified the results of Endara’s electoral victory provided the 
United States with a unique opportunity to remove a harsh dictator, execute regime 
change, and put in place someone who the population truly believed was legitimate.  
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 Sometimes, what a country declines to do says as much about it as what it actually 
does. The United States made a thoughtful decision to not support one of the coup 
attempts because those attempts did not support the restoration of the legitimate and 
democratically elected Panamanian government. The Reagan and Bush administrations 
quietly assessed several potential coup leaders and recognized that they could end up 
simply replacing one dictator with another. President Bush’s stance was that any 
prospective future leader of Panama seeking U.S. support must “express a clear intention 
to restore democracy ‘or we don’t commit.’”65 While the administration caught some 
political flak for not supporting these uprisings, its inaction likely enhanced the 
legitimacy of its assistance to Endara later on. Also, when the United States did finally 
decide to act, the U.S. public was more than ready to support the President’s decision.  
 The Panama operations provide a great example of how a country like the United 
States can utilize its forces and a strategy to quickly overwhelm and dominate an enemy 
while still adhering to the principle of proportionality prescribed by jus in bello, thus 
enhancing its argument for legitimacy. General Colin Powell, as the CJCS during 
Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty, reflected on the experience: “The lessons I 
absorbed from Panama confirmed all of my convictions over the preceding twenty years, 
since the days of doubt over Vietnam. Have a clear political objective and stick to it. Use 
all of the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes. 
Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives.”66 The U.S. went in to 
Panama with a relatively large amount of troops considering the size of the country; 
however, restrictions such as “(1) limit collateral damage and (2) minimize casualties on 
both sides” demonstrated the administration’s commitment to executing a just, limited 
war, while winning quickly.67 Restrictions such as these helped to ensure that the United 
States maintained legitimacy in the eyes of both the Panamanian and U.S. domestic 
populations.  
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 Building and maintaining public support for the use of force is no small feat. 
Demonstrating the legitimacy of the cause, with sound political objectives and strategy 
supporting it, might check all of the appropriate boxes, but still fall short of motivating 
the population. Sometimes the public needs to put a face on the enemy.  
[A] President has to rally the country behind his policies. And when that 
policy is war, it is tough to arouse public opinion against political 
abstractions. A flesh-and-blood villain serves better. And Noriega was rich 
villain material.68 
F. CONCLUSION 
 Although there were points of friction in U.S. operations in Panama throughout 
the planning and execution phases, the United States was able to achieve its strategic 
objectives. One proof of this is that the government of Panama is to this day friendly to 
the United States. In the wake of Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty, U.S. 
citizens within Panama were protected; Noriega was brought to justice; the PDF was 
dismantled and re-built; and perhaps, most importantly, the United States continues to 
enjoy complete freedom of movement through the Panama Canal, whose strategic utility 
remains vital.  
In the end, public support was achieved for U.S. operations in Panama by the 
president first establishing and articulating clear and largely definable political 
objectives. These clear objectives enabled the creation and implementation of a fitting 
and adaptive strategy to accomplish the political objectives, thereby ensuring that 
legitimacy was bolstered throughout the operation. One portion of that equation did prove 
a little weak, namely the ambiguity of restoring democracy in Panama. However, proper 
strategic cooperation enabled U.S. leaders to effectively work together in order to still 
realize U.S. national interests without losing public support. As for the lessons to be 
drawn from this case, we could not put it better than the following: 
But amid the successful outcome of Operations Just Cause and Promote 
Liberty, one nagging question remained: Would a disconnect between 
combat and stability operations in a future conflict lead to greater chaos 
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over a longer period and with less satisfactory outcomes? The U.S. 
military and the political community that oversees it need to seriously 
contemplate the answer to that question.69 
When glancing back at Panama from Iraq, it seems that the concern raised in this 
passage was generally predictive of what was to come. 
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III. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The reason for our success is that in every instance we have carefully 
matched the use of military force to our political objectives. President 
[George H. W.] Bush, more than any other recent President, understands 
the proper use of military force. In every instance, he has made sure that 
the objective was clear and that we knew what we were getting into. We 
owe it to the men and women who go in harm’s way to make sure that 
their lives are not squandered for unclear purposes.70 
—GEN Colin L. Powell, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992 
If, as Colin Powell suggests, Operations Just and Cause and Promote Liberty 
proved the importance of properly integrating policy and strategy prior to the use of force 
then Operation Iraqi Freedom offers a stark contrast of a prolonged engagement during 
which the United States Government failed to properly manage the factors necessary for 
maintaining domestic public support. Thanks to the lack of clearly defined political 
objectives, a flawed strategy, an inability to cooperate at the highest levels of 
government, and the loss of perceived legitimacy all the way around, the United States 
did not just not succeed, but ended up irretrievably entangled, in sharp contrast to its 
success in Panama.   
B. POLICY 
 “On March 22, 2003, President George W. Bush told the United States that ‘Our 
mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam’s support 
of terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.’”71 Unfortunately, these objectives were not as 
clear, well-defined, or achievable as the President implied. For, if they were, the United  
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States and coalition forces should have left Iraq when “on 14 December 2003, 
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer announced the capture of Saddam to Iraq and the world.”72 
After all, once Saddam was captured, the United States had effectively both ended 
Saddam’s support of terrorism (if that ever existed) and freed the Iraqi people. 
Additionally, in the ten months between the initiation of combat operations and the 
capture of Saddam, it became clear that Saddam did not possess the kind of WMD that 
the United States feared he had—nuclear weapons—which should have satisfied the 
remaining policy objective. All of which begs the question: why, if these were the only 
objectives, did the United States stay?  
While contentious in hindsight, Bush’s first two objectives provided the most 
compelling rationale for going to war at the time. Today, most people believe that 
Saddam did not possess WMD, nor did he significantly support terrorists in the manner 
that was described. It was Bush’s third objective—that of freeing the Iraqi people—that 
kept the United States in Iraq.  
For citizens of a democracy, the idea of “freeing” another society sounds noble. 
Unfortunately, however, without a security and government apparatus to put in place 
after “liberating” Iraq, the United States was doomed to attempt to fill that role itself. 
Secretary Powell cautioned against this when he invoked “the Pottery Barn rule: you 
break it, you own it.”73 To be clear, owning meant restoring or nation-building. Yet, 
“Nations cannot be built. Most especially they cannot be built by well-meaning but 
culturally arrogant foreign social scientists, no matter how well intentioned and 
methodologically sophisticated.”74  
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One reason the United States was successful in Panama was because it was re-
instating a legitimately elected government—not creating a democracy overnight. In Iraq, 
the follow-on objective of creating a representative government once the Iraqi 
people were free was neither clearly articulated to the American or Iraqi people, nor was 
it well defined or achievable. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the 
United States’ involvement in Iraq became increasingly problematic: “Lacking precise 
political goals, military operations will drift, lose focus and more importantly, lose the 
public’s support.”75 
C. STRATEGY 
 On March 20, 2003, just a few days after President Bush issued his ultimatum 
demanding that “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours,” the 
ground war in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began, led by CENTCOM Commander 
General Tommy Franks.76 The strategy that Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush 
approved consisted of four phases. The phases with their pre-approved endstates were as 
follows:  
1. Phase I: Preparation included “establishing an ‘air bridge’ to transport 
forces into the region and securing ‘regional and international support for 
operations.’”77  
2. Phase II: Shaping the Battlespace “[to] target Iraq’s suspected WMD sites, 
Republican Guards formations, and command and control facilities, and 
prevent their use of Theater Ballistic Missiles.”78  
3. Phase III: Decisive Operations included “‘regime forces defeated or 
capitulated,’ and ‘regime leaders dead, apprehended, or marginalized.’”79  
                                                 
75 Lawrence P. Farrell Jr, “Before War Strategy Is Settled, Political Aims Must Be Defined,” National 
Defense Magazine, March 30, 2017, 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/December/Pages/BeforeWarStrategyIsSettled,Politi
calAimsMustBeDefined.aspx. 
76 Gregory Fontenot et al., On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press), 86. 
77 Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 351. 
78 Ibid., 389. 
79 Ibid., 351. 
 34 
4. Phase IV: Post-Hostility Operations included “the establishment of a 
representative form of government in a country capable of defending its 
territorial borders and maintaining internal security, without any weapons 
of mass destruction.”80  
As is well documented by now, the initial success of the U.S. strategy in Iraq was 
swifter and faster than even Franks anticipated. Unfortunately, success during the first 
three weeks of combat operations through partial completion of Phase III was followed 
by an uphill eight-year-long fight, never truly culminating in Phase IV.  
 Since OIF has been so well studied, in the remainder of this chapter we will 
simply highlight significant breakdowns in the strategy that we believe reveal errors in 
strategic thinking, ultimately degrading the potential for a positive outcome in Iraq. In an 
effort to make our assessments more digestible, we will examine problems observed 
before the invasion (ineffective planning, flawed assumptions, the absence of a consensus 
government-in-waiting), and then problems that arose or continued after the invasion 
(failure to police, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s disastrous decision-making, 
mishandling of the insurgency).  
1. Problems before the Invasion 
One of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s main failures that manifested itself almost 
immediately was ineffective planning for Phase IV. While there may not have been an 
absence of planning altogether, it is evident that there was no shared vision concerning 
the execution of operations in a post-Saddam Iraq. Incredibly, even after the initiation of 
combat operations, there was confusion over exactly which element among the ground 
forces executing the invasion would be responsible for Phase IV. According to one 
RAND study, “The lateness of this decision suggests the degree to which senior civilian 
and military leaders within DOD underestimated the challenges that would confront 
coalition military forces after the defeat of Iraqi forces.”81 
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 After the execution of a CENTCOM wargame in December 2002, the CJCS 
ordered the creation of an organization that would serve as the “nucleus around which 
Phase IV operations would be planned and conducted.”82 In January 2003, Task Force IV 
(TFIV) was stood up with the intent of filling this role. However, by mid-February the 
new Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Commander, General 
McKiernan, ordered Task Force IV’s dissolution. McKiernan ordered that one of his 
subordinate commands, V Corps, take the lead on Phase IV planning instead.83 This 
decision was problematic for a number of reasons:  
First, it [V Corps’ Phase IV plan] was completed at the end of April 2003, 
after the fall of Baghdad and after subsequent looting destroyed much of 
the infrastructure left intact by the military campaign and expanded the 
range of reconstruction requirements. Second, it lacked any additional 
resources; the forces and capabilities that had conducted major combat 
operations were the ones that would be available for postwar stability and 
reconstruction operations. Finally, the plan envisaged military forces 
supporting civilian reconstruction efforts, not playing the lead role. Yet … 
civilian reconstruction efforts suffered from unchallenged assumptions, a 
very short planning time, and a lack of coordination with the military.84 
As the passage above indicates, planning on the civilian side was not going well either. 
The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) (led by retired 
Lieutenant General Jay Garner) was not created until January 2003, leaving it only a few 
months to organize an effective Phase IV plan. Or, as Doug Borer and Stephen Twing put 
it, “ORHA was formally mandated to pull all of the existing stove-piped plans and … 
given the arguably impossible task of putting together an integrated phase four plan with 
less than eight weeks to go before the war started.”85  
Shortly after ORHA’s creation, members of its staff drafted a 20-page document 
that detailed significant flaws with the then-current strategy for Phase IV, specifically: 
“We risk letting much of the country descend into civil unrest and chaos whose 
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magnitude may defeat our national strategy of a stable new Iraq.”86 Nevertheless, 
information that challenged major assumptions held by senior policy makers, particularly 
Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfeld, ended up being dismissed or was 
insufficiently analyzed, preventing adjustments to the strategy prior to the invasion.87 
One RAND study highlights five serious unchallenged assumptions, four of which led to 
increased complacency regarding Phase IV planning: 1) “The military campaign would 
have a decisive end and would produce a stable security environment;” 2) “U.S. and 
coalition forces would be greeted as liberators;” 3) “Government ministries would 
continue to function;” 4) “Infrastructure throughout the country would remain largely 
intact.”88 Meanwhile, even had these gaps in the strategy been identified by ORHA, 
Garner was notified that he would be relieved and the organization was disbanded only 
days after his arrival in Baghdad on April 24, 2003. Thus, alerting him to the gaps would 
have pointless.   
 Yet another major obstacle standing in the way of any positive political outcome 
was the absence of a consensus government-in-waiting prior to the invasion. There was 
much debate over the make-up of the interim Iraqi government. Members of DOD, 
specifically within the Office of Special Plans, wanted a government comprised of exiles 
because they could be emplaced quickly and would prevent Baathists from participating 
in the new government. The “[Department of] State and the CIA argued that an interim 
[Iraqi] government composed of externals would have no domestic legitimacy.”89 Sadly, 
the United States would combine the worst of both courses of action by waiting until 
June 2004, sixteen months after invading, before installing a government composed 
entirely of exiles.90 This delay itself created immense problems since the lack of an 
identified Iraqi leadership made it extremely difficult for the United States to achieve 
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policy objectives with regard to establishing a representative government.91 Tommy 
Franks himself notes that as the debate continued, “America drew closer to war. Iraq’s 
new leadership would have to be identified on the fly, even as the military liberation 
was under way. Perhaps an Iraqi general would step forward, or a figure from the 
educated elite.”92 Frank’s description is especially troubling because it reveals that he 
believed the war to be virtually inevitable, and that senior decision makers were going to 
execute it regardless of whether the appropriate conditions were set or not.  
2. Problems after the Invasion 
 As mentioned in the RAND quote cited earlier, the military’s failure to stop the 
looting which ensued after Saddam’s fall had a catastrophic impact on remaining 
infrastructure and severely set back reconstruction efforts that would be necessary 
moving forward. However, perhaps worse, was what this did to the population’s view of 
coalition forces; it delegitimized them and undermined their authority. As Daniel Byman 
explains, “The psychological blow was perhaps the most massive. Iraqis believed that 
Americans would quickly restore the country to prosperity. The looting discredited 
the occupying authority and its Iraqi Allies, making them more an object of ridicule than 
of fear.”93 
 No matter how flawed the strategy was up to this point, many observers would 
contend that worse was yet to come under ORHA’s replacement, the CPA. Almost 
immediately upon his arrival in Iraq, the head of the CPA and the President’s envoy, 
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, made two monumental decisions. The first was de-
Baathification, and the second was the dissolution of the Iraqi Armed Forces. As many 
expected him to do, Bremer ordered the removal of “senior party members.” But, then, in 
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addition he dismissed “anyone holding a position in the top three management layers of 
any ministry, government-run corporation, university, or hospital.” In other words, 
anyone “who was a party member—even of junior rank—would be deemed to be a senior 
Baathist and so would be fired.”94 This decision gutted almost every entity within the 
Iraqi government. Worse, it further complicated the already difficult reconstruction 
efforts, as many of the Iraqi professionals who were needed to carry out Phase IV tasks 
were Baath party members.95 Finally, the de-Baathification order, having been issued by 
a coalition authority and not by a provisional Iraqi authority, lent credence to the view 
that the United States was an occupier and not a liberator, particularly in the eyes of 
Sunnis who had held many of these government positions.  
 The dissolution of the Iraqi armed forces would have equally negative physical 
and psychological consequences. In the physical realm, this decision directly affected 
approximately 400,000 Iraqis, which not only made it nearly impossible to provide local 
security as the order sent Iraqi army and police units home, but put hundreds of thousands 
of armed, trained, and angry men on the streets of Iraq.96 Adding still more fuel to the 
fire was the psychological effect as the “the army was considered a national symbol and 
was widely respected … perhaps most important, retaining the army would have sent 
Sunnis a message that in one key institution their influence would remain 
considerable.”97  
 No doubt these actions placed the United States firmly in the crosshairs of many 
Iraqis; in fact, the ensuing insurgency should have come as no surprise. While the COIN 
campaign(s) in Iraq could (and should) be the subject of numerous other theses, some 
flaws in the U.S. approach need to be mentioned here.  For instance, David Galula’s 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, a foundational text for the COIN Field 
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Manual, cites four laws that should govern a counter-insurgent approach. The first and 
third laws shed important light on the error of U.S. ways in Iraq.  
 According to Galula’s first law, “The support of the population is as necessary for 
the counter-insurgent as for the insurgent.”98 The insurgent relies on the population for a 
number of essential undertakings, ranging from masking his force to enable him to hide 
amongst the populace, to reconstituting his forces following losses in battle via 
recruitment. Without the support of the population, the insurgency is doomed to die on 
the vine.  But the same is true, according to Galula, for the counter-insurgent. Yet, no 
matter how simple in concept, the contest over support of the population can prove 
extremely difficult in execution, especially in conflicts where the counter-insurgent is to 
blame for generating grievances that did not previously exist (i.e., devastated 
infrastructure). Winning the population’s support is further complicated when the 
insurgency has ample time to establish firm control thanks to the absence of a 
comprehensive COIN effort. Not coincidentally, these describe the conditions in Iraq.  
 Meanwhile, Galula’s third law reminds counter-insurgents that “support from the 
population is conditional.”99 In other words, in an area where the population is under 
enemy control, conditions must be established by the COIN force that will allow for the 
liberation of the population. According to Galula: 
The minority hostile to the insurgent will not and cannot emerge as long as 
the threat has not been lifted to a reasonable extent. Furthermore, even 
after the threat has been lifted, the emerging counter-insurgent supporters 
will not be able to rally the bulk of the population so long as the 
population is not convinced that the counter-insurgent has the will, the 
means, and the ability to win.100  
The significance of meeting these conditions cannot be overstated. Even if members of 
the population agree that the counter-insurgent's cause is valid and righteous, if they do 
not believe that the COIN force can provide lasting protection, or they fear that the COIN 
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force will eventually lose or prematurely leave, they will side with the enemy. They will 
do so because, in their eyes, this is the only way to enhance their chances of survival. 
Sadly, U.S. actions in Iraq did too little to secure support from the populace, especially 
when this support was conditional upon improved conditions and enhanced security.  
 Finally, we would point out that the employment of conventional forces against 
an irregular adversary was bound to lead to a protracted engagement, in violation of 
Galula’s laws, and also in defiance of Arreguín-Toft’s opposite-approach theory (as 
described in the Introduction). Once large numbers of ground troops proved ineffective at 
denying insurgents freedom of maneuver (which transpired in Iraq), this led to an 
environment which proved target rich for the insurgents who, by carefully selecting 
targets of opportunity, demonstrated their strength to the contested population and, worse, 
delegitimized the credibility of the COIN force. Worse yet, the United States’ inability to 
improve conditions on the ground did nothing to maintain or bolster public support at 
home, and may have helped lead to a premature exit.101  
 We must stress that we do not believe a better COIN approach integrated into the 
overall strategy for Iraq would have necessarily produced a win for the United States in 
Iraq. Even the best strategy is pointless in the face of failed policy objectives. Here, what 
we want to stress is that the ways and means implemented within the strategy (such as it 
was) were not conducive to achieving the articulated ends, as proven by the final 
outcome.  
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D. STRATEGIC COOPERATION  
 During the run up to Iraq, an absence of strategic cooperation most certainly made 
the pursuit of U.S. policy aims more difficult, hamstringing the ways and means that 
would be pursued. Moreover, infighting and marginalization of key principals, (most 
notably the Secretary of State and to a lesser degree the National Security Advisor) 
seemed to hurt the administration’s ability to assess the appropriateness of the invasion 
and, worse, whether or not success was even possible. An unwillingness to cooperate at 
the highest levels of government certainly seemed to mire the United States in the trap 
that Samuel Huntington predicted will cause a nation to “squander their resources and run 
uncalculated risk.”102  
 Also, although “a powerful alliance of top leaders, led by Vice President Cheney 
and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, that shared the basic viewpoint that the major combat 
phase of the war would be the only real challenge, and that post war Iraq would take care 
of itself,” the few dissenters had little sway.103 Tellingly, some observers attribute 
Cheney’s and Rumsfeld’s unwillingness to consider that serious problems might arise in 
Phase IV to their fear that detailed planning for post-combat operations could potentially 
serve as an “impediment” for going to war in the first place.104  
Conflicting opinions and individuals who held them have been described as 
having been sidelined, regardless of their military or political experience. Most notably, 
Secretary of State Powell was not able to leverage his prior experience as he was 
“continually bypassed” by the president and excluded from “private meetings with 
Cheney and, increasingly, Rumsfeld.”105 Powell and the State Department, at one point 
or another, specifically disagreed with decisions related to: an Iraqi interim government  
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“composed solely of exiles;”106 evidence indicating that Iraq had WMD;107 the concept 
that Iraq could be transformed by the U.S. into a flourishing democracy;108 and the idea 
that Iraq was connected to terrorist organizations responsible for the September 11th 
attacks.109 Powell even went so far as to state that diplomacy had to be exhausted and 
international support gained prior to the use of military force.110 Powell was not in any 
fundamental way opposed to war. Rather, he clearly understood that without clear 
objectives, or logical ways to achieve them, the utility of war is greatly diminished.  
The last nail in the coffin regarding Phase IV planning was the dismissal of the 
State Department’s Future of Iraq Project.  
Even though the Future of Iraq project was the most comprehensive effort 
within the U.S. government to examine the challenges and requirements of 
Iraq after Saddam, its insights and suggestions were not used as a basis for 
postwar planning efforts within the interagency process … Internal 
bureaucratic challenges and external suspicion about State’s true motives, 
therefore, combined to marginalize State’s influence on the postwar 
planning process, as well as to limit the dissemination of ideas and 
information …111 
As we described in the Introduction, the responsibility of the Assistant to the President 
for National Security (ANSA) is to ensure that the President is briefed on a full range 
of policy options in order to guarantee that there is sufficient debate and analysis 
about those options. However, as the passage above indicates, alternative views, or 
even dissenting opinions were not to be considered under the Cheney/Rumsfeld 
duopoly, which greatly minimized Condoleezza Rice’s ability to assert control over the 
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democratic process that should have governed the National Security Council. Or, as 
Borer and Twing explain:  
There were dysfunctional power asymmetries among the principals, a 
failure to assure a balanced flow of information and advice to the 
president, and a lack of opportunities for wide ranging and honest 
assessment of a set of overly optimistic assumptions about postconflict 
Iraq.112 
The fact that the National Security Advisor had to resort to sending spies into the 
Pentagon in order to obtain information concerning war plans was a sure sign that the 
system had arguably failed.113  
In short, thanks to senior policy and decision makers being intentionally 
marginalized or kept out of the policy decision-making process, gaps arose in the Bush 
administration’s approach to war. As obvious as it may seem that our nation’s highest 
leaders should be bound to at least consider the full range of potential complications that 
might arise from any use of force, they did not in this case. Likewise, they rendered 
certain key departments of our government irrelevant during foreign policy and war 
planning. By violating these basic rules, strategic cooperation became impossible.  
E. LEGITIMACY 
 Legitimacy is dynamic in that it can exist at varying levels or amounts over the 
course of a conflict. For instance, what once appeared to be a “just” cause for going to 
war can later be determined to have been a false premise. If so, what then happens, 
especially after the damage has been done? In this section, we briefly examine the United 
States case for establishing jus ad bello, and discuss how legitimacy and public support 
for the war in Iraq dwindled as initial conditions for going to war increasingly appeared 
to be false.  
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 Critics might well argue that the invasion of Iraq is a case of good salesmanship 
combined with idealistic goals and intense national anxiety over the threat of terrorism 
generating a higher level of public support for going to war than might have been 
realistically established had an argument for legitimacy and just war clearly been 
included in the discussion from the outset. Prior to the invasion, if one were to look at the 
list of criteria for embarking on a Just War—just cause, legitimate authority, right 
intention, announcement of that intention, last resort, proportionality, and a reasonable 
hope of success114—a strong case can be made that the United States had satisfied most 
of those conditions. To briefly recap some of the events leading up to the invasion, recall 
that in his February 5, 2003, address to the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell who, in 1993 polled as the “most trusted man in America,”115 provided the United 
Nations (UN) with a thorough and convincing argument that Saddam Hussein had 
supported terrorism and was seeking nuclear weapons.116  
 While the United States never issued a declaration of war, the U.S. Congress did 
approve a joint resolution known as the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Iraq Resolution of 2002 which “Authorizes the President to use the U.S. armed forces to: 
(1) defend U.S. national security against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) 
enforce all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”117 As for U.S. 
intentions, who could possibly argue that these were malicious at the time? The United 
States sought “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam’s support of 
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terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people,” as President Bush said.118 Furthermore, the 
argument about whether or not this invasion met the criteria of last resort was essentially 
rendered moot when Secretary Powell reminded the world that Iraq had “been found 
guilty of material breach of its obligations” to disarm its weapons of mass destruction, in 
more than 16 UN resolutions over a 12-year period.119 It was also well understood that 
Saddam was a destabilizing actor in the region due to his prior invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 and invasion of Iran in 1980.120 Surely, removing Saddam from power would free 
the people of Iraq and help to ease tensions in the region. Besides, it was argued, 
additional sanctions on Iraq would only harm the innocent and oppressed population.   
 Ultimately, the invasion of Iraq involved the United States in a war of choice—a 
preventative war to avert a future attack on America. The United States was making the 
case that the risk of inaction was greater than the risk of invading. U.S. planning efforts 
also had to satisfy the condition of proportionality in terms of weighing harm to civilians 
in Iraq, harm to the U.S. military, and the expected amount of disruption in the region. 
The U.S. military took great care during its planning of the invasion to try to select 
targets that would minimize civilian casualties.121 The Department of Defense pushed 
U.S. military leaders to deploy far fewer forces than they initially estimated would be 
needed to defeat the Iraqi Army and conduct stability operations.122 Even with all of 
these constraints, the U.S.-led coalition rose to the challenge and accomplished its 
mission of militarily defeating Saddam’s regime in a matter of weeks.123   
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Unfortunately, the effort to establish the legitimacy of U.S. operations in Iraq 
quickly unraveled after the invasion and, consequently, public support for the U.S. war 
effort began to wane. Iraq did not have nuclear weapons and was never proven to be a 
state-sponsor of terrorism. Furthermore, freeing the Iraqi people might “brief well,” but 
amounted to an incomplete policy and failed to meet both the just cause and right 
intention criteria for jus ad bellum. To fulfill the right intention criterion as an aggressor 
in war, you must have fully thought out what you plan to do and have a detailed plan for 
how to improve conditions of peace post-conflict. The United States did not do this. For 
example: 
The evidence shows that: (1) Military planning was thorough, 
demonstrating that other planning at the same level was possible. (2) After 
the invasion, it became clear that detailed U.S. government plans to 
manage Iraq after conquering it simply did not exist. (3) There was a lack 
of informed, positive planning to take care of the economic needs of Iraqi 
citizens. (4) There was no realistic plan for creating a stable, unified 
government among Iraq’s sharply disparate social, ethnic, and religious 
groups, simply a statement that the United States would do so. (5) There 
was no plan to deal with the virtual certainty of an eventual insurrection 
by at least some sectors of Iraqi society. In sum, the evidence shows a lack 
of the right intention necessary for a just war.124 
Meanwhile, “Proportionality of ends calls…for a painstaking, realistic calculation of the 
damage likely to be caused in the entire course of a war.”125 Incomplete and unclear 
policy objectives and incompetent planning made this criterion very hard to satisfy, too. 
For instance, on the issue of projected troop levels prior to the invasion, Deputy Secretary 
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some of the higher-end predictions that we have been hearing recently, 
such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to 
provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark.” He said it 
was “hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in 
post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself…126 
Tragically, it was Mr. Wolfowitz’s assertion that ended up being “wildly off the mark,” 
as U.S. troop levels in Iraq eventually surpassed 170,000 in October of 2007 during “the 
surge.”127 As is clear now, nearly a decade and a half later, the conditions that the U.S. 
public was led to believe justified the case for a just war may have turned out to be false. 
Saddam, who was certainly a brutal and terrible dictator, did not possess nuclear weapons 
or effectively sponsor terrorism.128  
 According to jus ad bellum criteria, what then happens when the criteria used to 
establish legitimacy for going to war are proven false? Once the conditions under which 
the war was justified are proven false, the war becomes illegitimate. Yet, once the United 
States had toppled Saddam’s regime, it had little choice but to stay and try to establish 
some sort of governance since it had toppled the government. In doing so, the United 
States found itself being re-taught the lesson that “changes of regime must be the work of 
the men and women who live under the regime—who also bear the costs of the change  
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and the risks of failure.”129 Efforts at regime change by outside entities have rarely 
proven effective and are almost never legitimate without the support of the local 
population. This is one key reason why Operation Just Cause was deemed legitimate and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was not.130 
F. CONCLUSION 
 “The failure in Iraq has a thousand fathers.”131 The lack of evidence of weapons 
of mass destruction, followed by the emergence of a violent insurgency certainly stoked 
the U.S. public’s frustration with the war in Iraq. Moreover, as described in this chapter, 
ineffective planning, flawed assumptions, the absence of a consensus government-in-
waiting prior to the invasion, a failure to police, the CPA’s disastrous decision-making, 
and the mishandling of the insurgency that followed proved sufficient to prevent stability 
from being attained. Yet, while these failures contributed to the evaporation of public 
support, sadly they are but symptoms of a greater failure.  
 The greater failure was the inability to establish strategic cooperation at the 
highest levels within and among DOD, DOS, the NSC and the White House. That alone 
prevented the United States government from establishing realistic and achievable policy 
objectives for the war. This failure in both cooperation and policy making was bound to  
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handicap any strategy produced by the military. After all, as already noted, “The role of 
the armed forces is to put forth the military strategy that supports political objectives. 
Poorly stated political objectives will result in a military strategy that is vague and 
perhaps even unachievable.”132 More than any other shortcoming, the inability of critical 
elements of the U.S. government to work together to develop a coherent and competent 
policy for Iraq yielded an insufficient strategy, set conditions for a decline in legitimacy, 
and led to the inevitable loss of U.S. public support. 
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IV. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The outcome of any war is often in doubt while the war is underway. The enemy 
always has a vote, and the fog and friction of war can alter the strategic trajectory of a 
conflict. At the end of the day, a failure in Iraq may have been unavoidable. Some might 
argue that the situation in Iraq was far more complex than anyone in Washington could 
have imagined and that the complex environment facilitated U.S. failures, ultimately 
leading to a loss of public support. However, even if correct, that should not excuse the 
flaws in our approach. If anything, uncertainty and/or a lack of understanding should 
have led to more exhaustive diplomacy, more careful analysis regarding our policy 
options, and construction of a strategy that would have reduced barriers to success in 
Phase IV.  
Washington’s approach to Iraq, when compared to how it handled Panama, is 
truly confusing. In Panama, the administration waited until diplomacy had been 
exhausted (even passing up the offer of a coup). Then it laid out detailed, achievable 
political aims and transmitted these to Panamanians and Americans, and to the world. 
Also, the strategy employed in Panama was crafted so as not to incite a guerrilla war in a 
country of only 4,000,000 people. In contrast, government agencies, to include the armed 
services, failed to sufficiently cooperate when it came to Iraq. The administration limited 
the range of policy options it would accept, produced vague political objectives, and 
employed a strategy that all but guaranteed the development of an insurgency in a Middle 
Eastern country with nearly 26,000,000 citizens.  
The intent in this thesis has not been to suggest that the United States was 
guaranteed a victory in Iraq. Certainly, other problems may have arisen absent the 
blunders already described. What we are arguing instead is that these blunders certainly 
did not help achieve any of Washington’s desired strategic outcomes. Moreover, we 
would submit that had decision-makers in Panama made decisions similar to those 
observed in Iraq, the conflict, and thus the utility yielded through victory, would have 
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been significantly different. Indeed, there is every reason to think that the United States 
could have been mired in a protracted insurgency which, in turn, would have had regional 
repercussions. Consequently, it is worth reviewing what helped prevent Panama from 
becoming an Iraq, and where Iraq missed being able to be a Panama.   
B. RECAP OF FACTOR COMPARISON 
1. Policy 
 The two case studies we selected enabled us to examine how our four different 
but inter-related factors impacted Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some of the differences were subtle and some were sharp. 
For example, in Panama, policy objectives were to: 1) protect American lives; 2) restore 
the democratic process; 3) preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties; and 4) 
apprehend Manuel Noriega.133 These objectives were consistently echoed by each key 
actor in the U.S. government. Moreover, the clarity and consistency of these policy aims 
over time allowed strategists to focus all of their actions on definitive and achievable 
goals. As a result, most Americans knew what the United States was doing and could tell 
when the military had accomplished its mission. Conversely, in Iraq our stated objectives 
were “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam’s support of 
terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.’”134 The slight difference between restoring 
democracy versus freeing a country may not sound significant to the average American, 
but it actually is. The former implies that a nation is already familiar with a democratic 
process and wishes to return to it. The latter assumes that, upon achieving freedom, a 
great light will shine down and people will know what to do with it: namely, embrace 
democracy as conceived by the liberators. To attempt to achieve the first is to pursue the 
status quo ante;135 to do the second is to start from ground zero.  
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2. Strategy 
 A strategy must describe more than a general path leading towards some hazy 
objective. An effective strategy must be created by intimately understanding the desired 
political ends in addition to having a rational concept by which to achieve those ends via 
fitting ways and means. Or, to rephrase this, strategists must do more than articulate the 
objectives they want to see at the end of each phase of war: they must in fact implement 
actions that will work towards achieving those objectives, without further complicating 
them.  
As a reminder, in Panama the U.S. strategy was stated as follows:  
Phase I: Combat operations at the onset were designed to neutralize and 
fix in place the PDF, capture Noriega, install a new government, 
and protect and defend U.S. citizens and key facilities.136 
Phase II: Stability operations to ensure law and order and begin the 
transition to support a newly installed government.137  
Phase III: Nation-building that supported the new Endara government to 
include restructuring and training the new government.138 
U.S. actions served to greatly facilitate the goals articulated within the strategy for 
Panama by:  
1. Placing in power the Endara government that was fairly elected by the 
Panamanian people;  
2. Preserving physical infrastructure through restraint in targeting during the 
invasion;  
3. Assisting in reconstruction efforts by providing security and policing after 
the completion of combat operations;  
4. Re-deploying combat troops and creating a structure that placed the U.S. 
Military Support Group in an actual supporting role to the newly formed 
Panamanian government and Panamanian initiatives; and  
5. Greatly reducing the risk of an insurgency by integrating the PDF back 
into the security apparatus.  
                                                 




 Now, recall the Iraq strategy. It was designed as follows:  
Phase I: Preparation included “establishing an ‘air bridge’ to transport forces into 
the region and securing ‘regional and international support for 
operations.’”139  
Phase II: Shaping the Battlespace “[to] target Iraq’s suspected WMD sites, 
Republican Guards formations, and command and control facilities, and 
prevent their use of Theater Ballistic Missiles.”140  
Phase III: Decisive Operations included “‘regime forces defeated or capitulated,’ 
and ‘regime leaders dead, apprehended, or marginalized.’”141  
Phase IV: Post-Hostility Operations included “the establishment of a 
representative form of government in a country capable of defending its 
territorial borders and maintaining internal security, without any weapons 
of mass destruction.”142  
In Iraq, U.S. actions served to greatly inhibit the goals articulated in this strategy, 
by:  
1. Failing to recognize the immensity of Phase IV obstacles;  
2. Failing to identify or build a consensus government prior to the invasion;  
3. Allowing looting to destroy much of the remaining physical infrastructure 
which necessitated expanded reconstruction requirements after combat 
operations; 
4. Prematurely replacing ORHA with the CPA which presided over Iraq as 
the interim government, largely disregarding Iraqi political initiatives;  
5. Dissolving the Iraqi security and political apparatus which greatly 
enhanced the probability of an insurgency (or, at a minimum, created a 
grievance that could be directly blamed on the United States); and  
6. Mishandling the insurgency by refusing to identify it as such and then 
employing a COIN effort extremely late, with misaligned conventional 
maneuver forces against an unconventional enemy.  
In summary, in Panama the United States’ actions worked toward achieving objectives 
set by strategy with the ultimate goal of achieving policy aims. In Iraq, they did not. 
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3. Strategic Cooperation   
 While reviewing the political goals to be achieved by Operation Just Cause, we 
consistently found the same goals listed across all manner of documents used and 
generated at the time. In these documents, the political goals were also generally 
described in nearly the exact same language. While searching for the same for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, an operation that we both participated in and remember vividly, we could 
not find a consistent set of goals, listed the same way, using the same verbiage, no matter 
how many speeches we read by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary 
Rumsfeld, or Secretary Powell. In fact, we initially planned to use a list of eight 
objectives that a Department of Defense spokeswoman described in a April 24, 2003, 
press conference. They were as follows: 1) “eliminate the regime of Saddam Hussein;” 2) 
“capture, kill, or drive out terrorists and terrorist organizations sheltering in Iraq;” 3) 
“collect intelligence on terrorist networks;” 4) “collect intelligence on weapons of mass 
destruction;” 5) “oversee their [WMD] destruction;” 6) “secure Iraqi oil fields;” 7) “end 
the UN sanctions against Iraq and begin sending humanitarian aid to the country;” and 8) 
“help the Iraqi people establish a representative government that does not threaten its 
neighbors.”143 However, among other problems, some of these were tactical-level 
objectives, some were normal intelligence objectives not worthy of going to war, some 
were just plain false, and some were diplomatic objectives. Nor did we see this list 
reproduced anywhere else.  
The more we dug, the more glaring the absence of a unified and clear message 
became. This appeared to result from a lack of strategic cooperation among our nation’s 
leaders. According to our research and many accounts, Rumsfeld and Cheney effectively 
blocked the President’s chief advisors on foreign policy and national security policy, one 
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of whom (Colin Powell) also happened to be the only one to have ever served in 
uniform—and they blocked him quite purposely.144  
 Here we do not mean to simply criticize Vice President Cheney and Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s leadership styles. Rather, we want to drive home the lessons we learned 
regarding the immense importance of strategic cooperation: when our nation’s leaders are 
willing to work with one another, we have the prospect of wartime success. However, 
when they are incapable or unwilling to do so, we can expect blunders.  
What also makes the cases of Panama and Iraq so valuable for comparison is how 
many of the same people served in leadership roles for both conflicts. Key leaders who 
participated in the planning for both endeavors are listed in Table 1.  
Table 1.   U.S. Key Leader Comparison  
 OPN Just Cause / 
Promote Liberty 
OPN Iraqi Freedom 
President George H. W. Bush George W. Bush 
Vice President Dan Quayle Dick Cheney 
Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs (ANSA) 
Brent Scowcroft Condoleezza Rice 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney Donald Rumsfeld 
Secretary of State James Baker Colin Powell 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) 
Colin Powell (after serving 
as ANSA under Reagan) 
Gen Richard Myers 
Misc. Senior Position:  Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy:  
Paul Wolfowitz 
Deputy SECDEF:  
Paul Wolfowitz 
Misc. Senior Position Dep SECDEF, then 
Director, CIA: Bob Gates 
Replaces Rumsfeld as SECDEF: 
Bob Gates 
Misc. Senior Position  ANSA: Brent Scowcroft President’s Intel Advisory 
Board: Brent Scowcroft 
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 During Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty our military and political 
leaders in the George H. W. Bush administration demonstrated a shared understanding of 
the strategic environment in Panama and how the United States should proceed to 
achieve its war aims. We do not believe that the United States was successful simply 
because Panama was weak, or because it was an easy war. Instead, we believe that our 
easy road to victory was facilitated by a correct approach to the conflict—a correct 
approach that would not have been possible without intimate cooperation among our 
nation’s leaders.  
 Yet again, in Operation Iraqi Freedom an extremely similar group of decision 
makers pursued a very different approach to war. We do not believe they did so because 
these individuals no longer had the capacity to think or lead effectively. Rather, it appears 
they lost sight of the significance of collaboration. The lack of cooperation at the strategic 
level was likely the single most important factor behind the failures in Iraq beginning 
with ineffective policy-making and ending with the loss of perceived legitimacy and a 
failure to maintain public support for the war. What seems tragically ironic in retrospect 
is that had the administration not marginalized Powell, “the Reluctant Warrior,” but had 
it heeded his counsel to adhere to the tenets of the Weinberger Doctrine, the United States 
might have avoided what Thomas Ricks, among others, has dubbed a “fiasco.”145 
Granted, there are significant underlying differences between Panama, a country 
that the United States helped literally and figuratively to construct, and Iraq. But these 
just underscore our broader point: with less familiarity with Iraq, should not Washington 
have taken greater care? Should it not have proceeded more carefully?146 Should it not 
have ensured that the necessary elements and agencies of government would have 
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146 Donald Rumsfeld to the U.S. Secretary of State, “The Swamp,” November 23, 1983, The 
Rumsfeld Archive, http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/24/11-23-
1983.%20Information%20Memorandum%20From%20Rumsfeld%20to%20The%20Secretary.%20The%20
Swamp.pdf.; Oddly enough, in the memorandum referenced here, Donald Rumsfeld writes to the U.S. 
Secretary of State in 1983, after concluding a trip around the Middle East, that “In the future, we should 
never use U.S. troops as a ‘peacekeeping force.’ We are too big a target. (Let the Fijians or New Zealanders 
do it); and…[keep] reminding ourselves that it is easier to get into something than it is to get out of it.” 
Naturally, this begs the question: How did the same person who made these astute observations in 1983, 
decide to completely ignore them and pursue aims in the opposite direction 20 years later? 
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strategically cooperated to achieve realistic political objectives? Yet, when one examines 
the cases side by side, as seen in Table 2, the Panama case throws into high relief just 
how prone to failure our endeavor in Iraq was, despite the tremendous efforts expended 
by the military. 
Table 2.   Decisions and their Impacts in Panama versus Iraq 




Intimate knowledge of infrastructure 
and day to day life of both enemy 
and populace 
Lack of intimate knowledge of 
infrastructure and day to day life of 
both enemy and populace 
Policy Clear, achievable political objectives 




identified/reconstituted and in 
concurrence with U.S. objectives 
prior to invasion 
No consensus government identified 
prior to U.S. invasion  
Physical infrastructure preserved 
through restraint during invasion; 
conditions set for reconstruction 
after combat operations via 
provision of security and policing  
Looting allowed to destroy much of 
the remaining physical infrastructure 
that had been preserved through 
restraint during the invasion; 
expanded reconstruction efforts were 
required after combat operations  
Combat troops re-deployed after 
security conditions were set; the 
Military Support Group 
subordinated to Panamanian 
government in support of 
Panamanian political initiatives  
Flow of combat troops was stopped 
prior to security being established; 
CPA prematurely replaced ORHA 
and largely disregarded Iraqi political 
initiatives  
PDF was re-integrated into the 
security apparatus, greatly reducing 
the likelihood of an insurgency  
Disbandment of the Iraqi security and 
political apparatuses increased the 
likelihood of an insurgency 
Prevention of insurgency ensured 
‘same-approach’ strategic 
interactions: direct vs. direct 
Creation of insurgency facilitated 
‘opposite-approach’ strategic 
interactions: direct vs. indirect 
Strategic 
Cooperation 
Strategic cooperation allowed for the 
creation of a shared vision regarding 
policy aims and a strategy whereby 
they could be achieved 
Lack of strategic cooperation 
prevented the consideration of 





Thanks to decisions listed above, 
perceived legitimacy was enhanced, 
ultimately maintaining public 
support for the conflict 
Thanks to decisions listed above, 
perceived legitimacy was degraded, 
ultimately leading to a loss of public 
support for the conflict 
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4. Legitimacy 
 As discussed previously, legitimacy is the bridge that connects policy, strategy 
and strategic cooperation to public support for the use of force. Legitimacy must be 
established prior to going to war in order to gain the required initial support for the use of 
force. Then, legitimacy must be protected and maintained throughout the war in order 
sustain public support for the war effort.  
Legitimacy in Panama was established via clear political objectives and was 
maintained by a strategy that, once quickly executed, saw the military return home 
swiftly. U.S. administration officials seemingly spoke with one voice when describing 
U.S. political objectives to the American people. Furthermore, U.S. strategists, given 
clear objectives, devised a plan that re-instated a legitimately elected leader while 
taking measures to prevent an insurgency from arising. They did so by limiting damage 
to infrastructure and by not removing everyone working in the Panamanian government. 
These actions ensured that the United States maintained legitimacy throughout 
the conflict. 
Legitimacy for going to war in Iraq was perceived to have been established prior 
to the invasion, but was lost when holes in U.S. policy were revealed and the United 
States failed to adapt once the well-published premise for going to war (e.g., WMD) was 
proven to be false.  
Again, with so many similarities in the lead-up to regime replacement, how did 
the two outcomes differ so greatly? For one, in contrast to Panama, the U.S. political 
objectives in Iraq, specifically “to free the Iraqi people”147 were poorly defined and 
therefore unachievable. While this should have been addressed prior to the invasion, the 
impact of this failure on the legitimacy of the war was not felt until after the Iraqi people 
were allegedly “free.”  
Even more importantly, the decision to go to war in Iraq also illustrates what can 
happen when sufficient public support for a conflict appears to temporarily relieve senior 
                                                 
147 Cramer and Thrall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? 1. 
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U.S. leaders of the responsibility to ensure the legitimacy of the conflict.148 After the 
United States failed to appropriately adapt to the fact that two of the three conditions the 
administration had used to justify the war were proven false, legitimacy was bound to 
diminish: Iraq did not have nuclear weapons and was not supporting terrorists. The 
capstone, however, was the fact that the United States had removed Saddam Hussein 
from power without a legitimate replacement and had implemented a policy and strategy 
of de-Baathification that essentially guaranteed that an insurgency would develop. The 
result is that public support fell back to a level more commensurate with revised 
perceptions of the legitimacy for the conflict: minimal at best.  
C. WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT? 
While conducting research for our two case studies, we found it extremely 
difficult to isolate any single factor in order to explain how that factor either assisted or 
hindered U.S. efforts. We discovered that this is a function of the extent to which these 
factors are inter-dependent. While any one of the factors, for instance, strategy, can be 
used to paint a picture that details what an appropriate strategy should consist of, an 
appropriate strategy, even though necessary, still is not sufficient for gaining and 
maintaining public support. Figure 1 is our effort to graphically depict the manner in 
which the factors interact throughout a conflict. 
 
                                                 
148 Frank Newport, “Seventy-Two Percent of Americans Support War Against Iraq,” Gallup.com, 




Figure 1.  Interaction of Factors Affecting Public Support for Conflict 
While policy is the basis for effective strategy and for establishing the jus ad 
bellum portion of legitimacy, strategy is key to maintaining the jus in bello element of 
legitimacy. Strategic cooperation is the notion that all elements responsible for United 
States foreign policy, to include the defense and intelligence communities, must work 
together to help develop policy that can be turned into strategy as well as strategy that is 
both appropriate and achievable. This is how legitimacy is maintained.   
Legitimacy is the bridge that connects our first three factors—policy, strategy, 
and strategic cooperation—to our ultimate goal: public support for the use of force. 
Policy, strategy, and strategic cooperation form the base of an argument for legitimacy. 
Levels of legitimacy are generally reflected via the degrees of public support for the use 
of force. So, how does one gain and maintain legitimacy, and in whose eyes does 
legitimacy most matter? Beginning with the latter question, there are generally three 
critical audiences: the domestic U.S. population, the population in the target country, and 
the international community at large. Legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community ensures that the United States adheres to international norms and treaties, 
which can help garner additional support for war efforts or coalition building. Legitimacy 
in the eyes of the target country’s population is essential for avoiding resistance or an 
insurgency, particularly if the United States is executing regime change and/or plans to 
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nation-build after major combat operations. Last, and most importantly, legitimacy in the 
eyes of the American public is crucial if an administration hopes to establish and 
maintain public support. 
Public support is a byproduct of the relationships just described. In order to 
establish and maintain public support, the United States should not focus on achieving it 
directly. Rather, public support can only be sustained if there is a clear, achievable policy, 
a sound strategy, and strategic cooperation throughout. Only this will ensure that our 
operations are legitimate. Why is public support so important? Because “If the external 
power’s ‘will’ to continue the struggle is destroyed, then its military capability—no 
matter how powerful—is totally irrelevant.”149  
Or, to restate this and return to our initial assertions, when the U.S. population 
moves from being supportive or complacent to actively withdrawing support from U.S. 
participation in conflict it has crossed the threshold. Once this is passed, the operation, 
military leaders, political leaders, and so on, are “on the clock.” A theoretical timer has 
started and U.S. senior leadership now has three options: 1) win quickly, 2) get out 
quickly, or 3) get back under the threshold and regain public support. 
America possesses the most powerful military the world has ever seen. However, 
it appears that by neglecting to pay sufficient attention to the factors described in this 
thesis, Washington will continue to lose public support for military actions that do not 
meet the public’s expectations—expectations that our leaders set and must actively 
manage as conditions change. Not only does an inability to adapt or strategically 
cooperate imperil any strategy, but when the strategy and policy are flawed we can 
expect further losses—in legitimacy, conflicts, and lives.  
                                                 
149 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 179, doi: 10.2307/2009880. 
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APPENDIX  
The Weinberger Doctrine was created by Caspar Weinberger when he was 
Secretary of Defense for President Ronald Reagan. In it, he lists six conditions or 
tests that should be considered prior to committing U.S. forces to war. A summarized list 
is as follows:  
1. The commitment must be deemed vital to our national interest or that of 
our allies.150 
2. It should be made "wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of 
winning."151 
3. Political and military objectives and the ways to meet them must be 
clearly defined.152 
4. As conditions change, whether the commitment remains in the national 
interest must be reassessed.153 
5. Before a commitment is made, there must be "some reasonable assurance" 
of popular and congressional support.154 
6. A commitment to arms must be a last resort.155 
Colin Powell eventually added a seventh element to the Weinberger doctrine, 
which was:  
7. “before troops were committed to battle, U.S. officials must have worked 
out an ‘exit strategy,’ in a definite time frame, so the soldiers would not be 
expected to stay anywhere and fight indefinitely.”156  
With the addition of this seventh condition, the complete list is now often referred 
to as the Powell Doctrine.157  
                                                 








156 LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine,” 76. 
157 Ibid., 76. 
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